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That the publication of the Origin of Species marked an epoch in the develop-
ment of the natural sciences is well known to the layman. That the combina-
tion of the very words origin and species embodied an intellectual revolt and 
introduced a new intellectual temper is easily overlooked by the expert. The 
conceptions that had reigned in the philosophy of nature and knowledge for 
two thousand years, the conceptions that had become the familiar furniture of 
the mind, rested on the assumption of the superiority of the fixed and final; 
they rested upon treating change and origin as signs of defect and unreality. In 
laying hands upon the sacred ark of absolute permanency, in treating the forms 
that had been regarded as types of fixity and perfection as (2) originating and 
passing away, the Origin of Species introduced a mode of thinking that in the end 
was bound to transform the logic of knowledge, and hence the treatment of 
morals, politics, and religion. 
No wonder, then, that the publication of Darwin's book, a half century 
ago, precipitated a crisis. The true nature of the controversy is easily concealed 
from us, however, by the theological clamor that attended it. The vivid and 
popular features of the anti-Darwinian row tended to leave the impression that 
the issue was between science on one side and theology on the other. Such was 
not the case – the issue lay primarily within science itself, as Darwin himself 
early recognized. The theological outcry he discounted from the start, hardly 
noticing it save as it bore upon the «feelings of his female relatives». But for 
two decades before final publication he contemplated the possibility of being 
put down by his scientific peers as a fool or as crazy; and he set, as the measure 
of his success, the degree in which he should affect three men of science: Lyell 
in geology, Hooker in botany, and Huxley in zoology. 
Religious considerations lent fervor to the controversy, but they did not 
provoke it. Intellectually, religious emotions are not creative but conservative. 
They attach themselves readily to the current view of the world and consecrate 
it. They (3) steep and dye intellectual fabrics in the seething vat of emotions; 
they do not form their warp and woof. There is not, I think, an instance of any 
large idea about the world being independently generated by religion. Although 
the ideas that rose up like armed men against Darwinism owed their intensity 
to religious associations, their origin and meaning are to be sought in science 
and philosophy, not in religion. 
 
II 
Few words in our language foreshorten intellectual history as much as does the 
word ‘species’. The Greeks, in initiating the intellectual life of Europe, were 
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impressed by characteristic traits of the life of plants and animals; so impressed 
indeed that they made these traits the key to defining nature and to explaining 
mind and society. And truly, life is so wonderful that a seemingly successful 
reading of its mystery might well lead men to believe that the key to the secrets 
of heaven and earth was in their hands. The Greek rendering of this mystery, 
the Greek formulation of the aim and standard of knowledge, was in the 
course of time embodied in the word ‘species’, and it controlled philosophy for 
two thousand years. To understand the intellectual face-about expressed in the 
phrase ‘origin of species’, we must, then, (4) understand the long dominant 
idea against which it is a protest. 
Consider how men were impressed by the facts of life. Their eyes fell 
upon certain things slight in bulk, and frail in structure. To every appearance, 
these perceived things were inert and passive. Suddenly, under certain circum-
stances, these things – henceforth known as seeds or eggs or germs – begin to 
change, to change rapidly in size, form, and qualities. Rapid and extensive 
changes occur, however, in many things – as when wood is touched by fire. 
But the changes in the living thing are orderly; they are cumulative; they tend 
constantly in one direction; they do not, like other changes, destroy or con-
sume, or pass fruitless into wandering flux; they realize and fulfil. Each succes-
sive stage, no matter how unlike its predecessor, preserves its net effect and al-
so prepares the way for a fuller activity on the part of its successor. In living 
beings, changes do not happen as they seem to happen elsewhere, any which 
way; the earlier changes are regulated in view of later results. This progressive 
organization does not cease till there is achieved a true final term, a telos, a 
completed, perfected end. This final form exercises in turn a plenitude of func-
tions, not the least noteworthy of which is production of germs like those from 
which it took its own origin, germs capable of the same cycle of self-fulfilling 
activity. 
(5) But the whole miraculous tale is not yet told. The same drama is en-
acted to the same destiny in countless myriads of individuals so sundered in 
time, so severed in space, that they have no opportunity for mutual consulta-
tion and no means of interaction. As an old writer quaintly said, «things of the 
same kind go through the same formalities» – celebrate, as it were, the same 
ceremonial rites. 
This formal activity which operates throughout a series of changes and 
holds them to a single course; which subordinates their aimless flux to its own 
perfect manifestation; which, leaping the boundaries of space and time, keeps 
individuals distant in space and remote in time to a uniform type of structure 
and function: this principle seemed to give insight into the very nature of reali-
ty itself. To it Aristotle gave the name, eidos. This term the scholastics translated 
as species. 
The force of this term was deepened by its application to everything in 
the universe that observes order in flux and manifests constancy through 
change. From the casual drift of daily weather, through the uneven recurrence 
of seasons and unequal return of seed time and harvest, up to the majestic 
sweep of the heavens – the image of eternity in time – and from this to the un-
changing pure and contemplative intelligence beyond nature lies one unbroken 
fulfilment of ends. Nature (6) as a whole is a progressive realization of purpose 
strictly comparable to the realization of purpose in any single plant or animal. 
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The conception of eidos, species, a fixed form and final cause, was the 
central principle of knowledge as well as of nature. Upon it rested the logic of 
science. Change as change is mere flux and lapse; it insults intelligence. Genu-
inely to know is to grasp a permanent end that realizes itself through changes, 
holding them thereby within the metes and bounds of fixed truth. Completely 
to know is to relate all special forms to their one single end and good: pure 
contemplative intelligence. Since, however, the scene of nature which directly 
confronts us is in change, nature as directly and practically experienced does 
not satisfy the conditions of knowledge. Human experience is in flux, and 
hence the instrumentalities of sense-perception and of inference based upon 
observation are condemned in advance. Science is compelled to aim at realities 
lying behind and beyond the processes of nature, and to carry on its search for 
these realities by means of rational forms transcending ordinary modes of per-
ception and inference. 
There are, indeed, but two alternative courses. We must either find the 
appropriate objects and organs of knowledge in the mutual interactions of 
changing things; or else, to escape the (7) infection of change, we must seek 
them in some transcendent and supernal region. The human mind, deliberately 
as it were, exhausted the logic of the changeless, the final, and the transcend-
ent, before it essayed adventure on the pathless wastes of generation and trans-
formation. We dispose all too easily of the efforts of the schoolmen to inter-
pret nature and mind in terms of real essences, hidden forms, and occult facul-
ties, forgetful of the seriousness and dignity of the ideas that lay behind. We 
dispose of them by laughing at the famous gentleman who accounted for the 
fact that opium put people to sleep on the ground it had a dormitive faculty. 
But the doctrine, held in our own day, that knowledge of the plant that yields 
the poppy consists in referring the peculiarities of an individual to a type, to a 
universal form, a doctrine so firmly established that any other method of 
knowing was conceived to be unphilosophical and unscientific, is a survival of 
precisely the same logic. This identity of conception in the scholastic and anti-
Darwinian theory may well suggest greater sympathy for what has become un-
familiar as well as greater humility regarding the further unfamiliarities that his-
tory has in store. 
Darwin was not, of course, the first to question the classic philosophy 
of nature and of knowledge. The beginnings of the revolution are in the (8) 
physical science of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. When Galileo said: 
«it is my opinion that the earth is very noble and admirable by reason of so 
many and so different alterations and generations which are incessantly made 
therein», he expressed the changed temper that was coming over the world; the 
transfer of interest from the permanent to the changing. When Descartes said: 
«the nature of physical things is much more easily conceived when they are be-
held coming gradually into existence, than when they are only considered as 
produced at once in a finished and perfect state», the modern world became 
self-conscious of the logic that was henceforth to control it, the logic of which 
Darwin’s Origin of Species is the latest scientific achievement. Without the meth-
ods of Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, and their successors in astronomy, physics, 
and chemistry, Darwin would have been helpless in the organic sciences. But 
prior to Darwin the impact of the new scientific method upon life, mind, and 
politics, had been arrested, because between these ideal or moral interests and 
the inorganic world intervened the kingdom of plants and animals. The gates 
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of the garden of life were barred to the new ideas; and only through this gar-
den was there access to mind and politics. The influence of Darwin upon phi-
losophy resides in his having conquered the phenomena of life for the princi-
ple of (9) transition, and thereby freed the new logic for application to mind 
and morals and life. When he said of species what Galileo had said of the 
earth, e pur se muove, he emancipated, once for all, genetic and experimental ide-
as as an organon of asking questions and looking for explanations. 
 
III 
The exact bearings upon philosophy of the new logical outlook are, of course, 
as yet, uncertain and inchoate. We live in the twilight of intellectual transition. 
One must add the rashness of the prophet to the stubbornness of the partizan 
to venture a systematic exposition of the influence upon philosophy of the 
Darwinian method. At best, we can but inquire as to its general bearing – the 
effect upon mental temper and complexion, upon that body of half-conscious, 
half – instinctive intellectual aversions and preferences which determine, after 
all, our more deliberate intellectual enterprises. In this vague inquiry there hap-
pens to exist as a kind of touchstone a problem of long historic currency that 
has also been much discussed in Darwinian literature. I refer to the old prob-
lem of design versus chance, mind versus matter, as the causal explanation, first 
or final, of things. 
As we have already seen, the classic notion of (10) species carried with 
it the idea of purpose. In all living forms, a specific type is present directing the 
earlier stages of growth to the realization of its own perfection. Since this pur-
posive regulative principle is not visible to the senses, it follows that it must be 
an ideal or rational force. Since, however, the perfect form is gradually approx-
imated through the sensible changes, it also follows that in and through a sen-
sible realm a rational ideal force is working out its own ultimate manifestation. 
These inferences were extended to nature: (a) She does nothing in vain; but all 
for an ulterior purpose. (b) Within natural sensible events there is therefore 
contained a spiritual causal force, which as spiritual escapes perception, but is 
apprehended by an enlightened reason. (c) The manifestation of this principle 
brings about a subordination of matter and sense to its own realization, and 
this ultimate fulfilment is the goal of nature and of man. The design argument 
thus operated in two directions. Purposefulness accounted for the intelligibility 
of nature and the possibility of science, while the absolute or cosmic character 
of this purposefulness gave sanction and worth to the moral and religious en-
deavors of man. Science was underpinned and morals authorized by one and 
the same principle, and their mutual agreement was eternally guaranteed. 
(11) This philosophy remained, in spite of sceptical and polemic out-
bursts, the official and the regnant philosophy of Europe for over two thou-
sand years. The expulsion of fixed first and final causes from astronomy, phys-
ics, and chemistry had indeed given the doctrine something of a shock. But, on 
the other hand, increased acquaintance with the details of plant and animal life 
operated as a counterbalance and perhaps even strengthened the argument 
from design. The marvelous adaptations of organisms to their environment, of 
organs to the organism, of unlike parts of a complex organ – like the eye – to 
the organ itself; the foreshadowing by lower forms of the higher; the prepara-
tion in earlier stages of growth for organs that only later had their functioning-
these things were increasingly recognized with the progress of botany, zoology, 
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paleontology, and embryology. Together, they added such prestige to the de-
sign argument that by the late eighteenth century it was, as approved by the 
sciences of organic life, the central point of theistic and idealistic philosophy. 
The Darwinian principle of natural selection cut straight under this phi-
losophy. If all organic adaptations are due simply to constant variation and the 
elimination of those variations which are harmful in the struggle for existence 
that is brought about by excessive reproduction, there (12) is no call for a prior 
intelligent causal force to plan and preordain them. Hostile critics charged 
Darwin with materialism and with making chance the cause of the universe. 
Some naturalists, like Asa Gray, favored the Darwinian principle and 
attempted to reconcile it with design. Gray held to what may be called design 
on the installment plan. If we conceive the “stream of variations” to be itself 
intended, we may suppose that each successive variation was designed from 
the first to be selected. In that case, variation, struggle, and selection simply de-
fine the mechanism of “secondary causes” through which the “first cause” 
acts; and the doctrine of design is none the worse off because we know more 
of its modus operandi. 
Darwin could not accept this mediating proposal. He admits or rather 
he asserts that it is «impossible to conceive this immense and wonderful uni-
verse including man with his capacity of looking far backwards and far into fu-
turity as the result of blind chance or necessity»2. But nevertheless he holds that 
since variations are in useless as well as useful directions, and since the latter 
are sifted out simply by the stress of the conditions of struggle for existence, 
the design argument as applied to living beings is unjustifiable; and its lack of 
support there deprives it (13) of scientific value as applied to nature in general. 
If the variations of the pigeon, which under artificial selection give the pouter 
pigeon, are not preordained for the sake of the breeder, by what logic do we 
argue that variations resulting in natural species are pre-designed3? 
 
IV 
So much for some of the more obvious facts of the discussion of de-
sign versus chance, as causal principles of nature and of life as a whole. We 
brought up this discussion, you recall, as a crucial instance. What does our 
touchstone indicate as to the bearing of Darwinian ideas upon philosophy? In 
the first place, the new logic outlaws, flanks, dismisses – what you will – one 
type of problems and substitutes for it another type. Philosophy forswears in-
quiry after absolute origins and absolute finalities in order to explore specific 
values and the specific conditions that generate them. 
Darwin concluded that the impossibility of assigning the world to 
chance as a whole and to design in its parts indicated the insolubility of the 
question. Two radically different reasons, (14) however, may be given as to 
why a problem is insoluble. One reason is that the problem is too high for in-
telligence; the other is that the question in its very asking makes assumptions 
that render the question meaningless. The latter alternative is unerringly point-
ed to in the celebrated case of design versus chance. Once admit that the sole 
verifiable or fruitful object of knowledge is the particular set of changes that 
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generate the object of study together with the consequences that then flow 
from it, and no intelligible question can be asked about what, by assumption, 
lies outside. To assert – as is often asserted – that specific values of particular 
truth, social bonds and forms of beauty, if they can be shown to be generated 
by concretely knowable conditions, are meaningless and in vain; to assert that 
they are justified only when they and their particular causes and effects have all 
at once been gathered up into some inclusive first cause and some exhaustive 
final goal, is intellectual atavism. Such argumentation is reversion to the logic 
that explained the extinction of fire by water through the formal essence of 
aqueousness and the quenching of thirst by water through the final cause of 
aqueousness. Whether used in the case of the special event or that of life as a 
whole, such logic only abstracts some aspect of the existing course of events in 
order to reduplicate it as a petrified eternal principle (15) by which to explain 
the very changes of which it is the formalization. 
When Henry Sidgwick casually remarked in a letter that as he grew old-
er his interest in what or who made the world was altered into interest in what 
kind of a world it is anyway, his voicing of a common experience of our own 
day illustrates also the nature of that intellectual transformation effected by the 
Darwinian logic. Interest shifts from the wholesale essence back of special 
changes to the question of how special changes serve and defeat concrete pur-
poses; shifts from an intelligence that shaped things once for all to the particu-
lar intelligences which things are even now shaping; shifts from an ultimate 
goal of good to the direct increments of justice and happiness that intelligent 
administration of existent conditions may beget and that present carelessness 
or stupidity will destroy or forego. 
In the second place, the classic type of logic inevitably set philosophy 
upon proving that life must have certain qualities and values – no matter how 
experience presents the matter – because of some remote cause and eventual 
goal. The duty of wholesale justification inevitably accompanies all thinking 
that makes the meaning of special occurrences depend upon something that 
once and for all lies behind them. The habit of derogating from present mean-
ings and uses prevents our (16) looking the facts of experience in the face; it 
prevents serious acknowledgment of the evils they present and serious concern 
with the goods they promise but do not as yet fulfil. It turns thought to the 
business of finding a wholesale transcendent remedy for the one and guarantee 
for the other. One is reminded of the way many moralists and theologians 
greeted Herbert Spencer’s recognition of an unknowable energy from which 
welled up the phenomenal physical processes without and the conscious opera-
tions within. Merely because Spencer labeled his unknowable energy “God”, 
this faded piece of metaphysical goods was greeted, as an important and grate-
ful concession to the reality of the spiritual realm. Were it not for the deep 
hold of the habit of seeking justification for ideal values in the remote and 
transcendent, surely this reference of them to an unknowable absolute would 
be despised in comparison with the demonstrations of experience that knowa-
ble energies are daily generating about us precious values. 
The displacing of this wholesale type of philosophy will doubtless not 
arrive by sheer logical disproof, but rather by growing recognition of its futility. 
Were it a thousand times true that opium produces sleep because of its dormi-
tive energy, yet the inducing of sleep in the tired, and the recovery to waking 
life of the poisoned, would not be thereby one least step forwarded. And were 
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(17) it a thousand times dialectically demonstrated that life as a whole is regu-
lated by a transcendent principle to a final inclusive goal, none the less truth 
and error, health and disease, good and evil, hope and fear in the concrete, 
would remain just what and where they now are. To improve our education, to 
ameliorate our manners, to advance our politics, we must have recourse to 
specific conditions of generation. 
Finally, the new logic introduces responsibility into the intellectual life. 
To idealize and rationalize the universe at large is after all a confession of ina-
bility to master the courses of things that specifically concern us. As long as 
mankind suffered from this impotency, it naturally shifted a burden of respon-
sibility that it could not carry over to the more competent shoulders of the 
transcendent cause. But if insight into specific conditions of value and into 
specific consequences of ideas is possible, philosophy must in time become a 
method of locating and interpreting the more serious of the conflicts that oc-
cur in life, and a method of projecting ways for dealing with them: a method of 
moral and political diagnosis and prognosis. 
The claim to formulate a priori the legislative constitution of the uni-
verse is by its nature a claim that may lead to elaborate dialectic developments. 
But it is also one that removes (18) these very conclusions from subjection to 
experimental test, for, by definition, these results make no differences in the 
detailed course of events. But a philosophy that humbles its pretensions to the 
work of projecting hypotheses for the education and conduct of mind, individ-
ual and social, is thereby subjected to test by the way in which the ideas it pro-
pounds work out in practice. In having modesty forced upon it, philosophy al-
so acquires responsibility. 
Doubtless I seem to have violated the implied promise of my earlier 
remarks and to have turned both prophet and partizan. But in anticipating, the 
direction of the transformations in philosophy to be wrought by the Darwinian 
genetic and experimental logic, I do not profess to speak for any save those 
who yield themselves consciously or unconsciously to this logic. No one can 
fairly deny that at present there are two effects of the Darwinian mode of 
thinking. On the one hand, there are making many sincere and vital efforts to 
revise our traditional philosophic conceptions in accordance with its demands. 
On the other hand, there is as definitely a recrudescence of absolutistic philos-
ophies; an assertion of a type of philosophic knowing distinct from that of the 
sciences, one which opens to us another kind of reality from that to which the 
sciences give access; an appeal through experience to something (19) that es-
sentially goes beyond experience. This reaction affects popular creeds and reli-
gious movements as well as technical philosophies. The very conquest of the 
biological sciences by the new ideas has led many to proclaim an explicit and 
rigid separation of philosophy from science. 
Old ideas give way slowly; for they are more than abstract logical forms 
and categories. They are habits, predispositions, deeply engrained attitudes of 
aversion and preference. Moreover, the conviction persists – though history 
shows it to be a hallucination – that all the questions that the human mind has 
asked are questions that can be answered in terms of the alternatives that the 
questions themselves present. But in fact intellectual progress usually occurs 
through sheer abandonment of questions together with both of the alternatives 
they assume – an abandonment that results from their decreasing vitality and a 
change of urgent interest. We do not solve them: we get over them. 
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Old questions are solved by disappearing, evaporating, while new ques-
tions corresponding to the changed attitude of endeavor and preference take 
their place. Doubtless the greatest dissolvent in contemporary thought of old 
questions, the greatest precipitant of new methods, new intentions, new prob-
lems, is the one effected by the scientific revolution that found its climax in the 
Origin of Species. 
